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Abstract
The paper analyses the typology of capitalism in Croatia. The Croatian form of 
capitalism is specific, in form and origin, with links between the pre-independence 
and post-independence periods, implying that capitalism has gradually evolved – 
from the political during the eighties towards current clientelistic capitalism. The 
manufacturing focus aims to facilitate the analysis of institutional, political and 
economic changes over the past forty years, emphasising the implications of 
institutional changes which have to a great extent, apart from the war of course, 
influenced the evolution of capitalism. The paper finds that the transition generated 
a number of costs, mainly generated by the state (fall in employment, manufacturing 
and social capital). The claim that the manufacturing industry has inherited low 
competitiveness neglects the necessary discussion on the role of the state in the 
formation of industrial policy and market actions. It is also an ex post argument for 
the claim that restructuring should have been implemented prior to privatisation as 
this would reduce negative impacts. Institutional changes led to a drastic reduction 
of the role of the manufacturing sector in the economy. The main finding in this 
paper is that the change in the interaction between the financial and the real sectors 
of the economy, the educational system and industrial relations system exposed the 
vulnerability of the current institutional environment. Despite similarities, 
institutional advantages of political capitalism are lost in the new type of Croatian 
capitalism, due to the complexity of the double transition process and the institutional 
or socio-economic particularities.
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1. Introduction 
The aim of our research is to more closely determine the Croatian variety of capitalism 
by analysing the manufacturing industry and its position within the institutional 
structure of the Croatian economy. The importance of the manufacturing industry in 
generating employment is well known, direct as well as indirect, through the 
connected industries4. Moreover, as we shall show below, for decades the 
manufacturing industry has been one of the most important industries in Croatia.
In the paper we present the thesis that the Croatian variety of capitalism is specific 
in its form and development. Its links to the preceding period enable us to deal with 
a process of gradual evolution from political capitalism to a clientelist one. We 
attempt to answer the question of the degree of change the industrial structure went 
through and if after the ”transition” the inefficiencies of the former system 
(technological underdevelopment and excessive employment) were replaced by 
new costs stemming from monopolistic and oligopolistic behaviour. We also 
attempt to identify potential institutional complementarities, i.e. the deficiencies 
which are affecting the competitiveness of the manufacturing industry as well as its 
ability to create new workplaces within the current economic, technological and 
institutional surrounding. 
The termination of the inefficient self-management model, marked by monopolistic 
activities, was played out via a neoliberal model of cutting links between the state, 
the real and the financial sector, with a widespread clientelism substituting for the 
former political connections. It was expected that the massive and inefficient 
industrial systems of the former state would be replaced by entrepreneurial activity, 
generating an economic recovery based on market principles and competitiveness, 
but this has never occurred. 
The transformation of the manufacturing industry based itself on ownership 
transformation and privatization. The political rhetoric put emphasis on 
restructuring the ownership of the Croatian economy in the conditions of transition 
to market mechanisms of doing business, never assessing the (potential) costs of 
such attempts but simply stating their inevitability. Spevec (2005: 161) underlines 
the fact that in Croatia privatization was for the most part completed before the 
Croatian Competition Agency became functional, and set as a priority while all 
other reforms with the potential to contribute to the system coherence were 
neglected. Since a precisely formulated and systematic industrial policy did not 
exist, (Spevec, 2005: 161) the (potentially) competitive but un-restructured 
segments of the industry (e.g. shipbuilding) were left unattended and forced to cope 
on their own. 
4 Industrial policy is among the key goals of the EU development strategy (EU 2020), see EC (2010). 
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As a result of the mentioned economic processes in the country, as well as those 
globally, the manufacturing industry was, within the economic and institutional 
milieu, reduced to only a portion of its former results in production, employment and 
competitiveness. In spite of the numerous similarities between the former socialist 
socio-economic system (termed by Županov (2002) as the political capitalism) and 
the current capitalist one, the manufacturing industry lost its institutional support in 
the current system, which also meant losing its role in the economy. 
The paper is based on the concepts of the institutionalist analysis which takes into 
account the national specificities of the country as well as the global socio-economic 
determinants which affect the national socio-economic system.  
In describing the socio-economic system of the Socialist Republic of Croatia and 
the Republic of the Croatia we use the concept of institutional complementarity (see 
Amable, 2000). This starting point should provide analytical precision and enable 
us to develop detailed depictions of institutions in these two systems. Since the 
paper aims to explain the position and role of manufacturing industry in the socialist 
and capitalist periods, it will best fit in the approach used by the varieties of 
capitalism literature which puts the individual firm in the centre of analysis (see 
Hall and Soskice, 2004), at the same time following Amable (2003) in considering 
the wider institutional structure of the economy. However, as Hall and Soskice 
(2004) characterisation of capitalist economies is dualistic, focusing on either 
predominant market-based relations (in what they term liberal market economies) 
or predominant non-market relations (in so called coordinated market economies) 
we shall stick to Amable’s (2003) concept, which we find somewhat richer – see 
table 1, which summarizes the description of the South European type of capitalism 
as used by this author. 
Table 1: South European type of capitalism by institutional areas 
Product market 
competition
Wage–labour
nexus
Financial sector Social protection Education
Price- rather than 
quality-based 
competition, 
involvement of the
State, little ‘non-
price’ coordination, 
moderate protection
against foreign
trade or investment, 
importance
of small firms 
High employment 
protection
(large firms) but
dualism: a ‘ﬂexible’ 
fringe of
employment in
temporary and
part-time work,
possible conﬂicts
in industrial relations, 
no active
employment policy, 
centralization
of wage bargaining 
Low protection of 
external shareholders,
high ownership
concentration,
bank-based corporate 
governance, no active 
market for corporate 
control (takeovers, 
mergers and acquisitions), 
low sophistication of
financial markets,
limited development of 
venture capital, high
banking concentration 
Moderate level 
of social 
protection,
expenditures
structure oriented 
towards poverty 
alleviation and 
pensions, high
involvement of
the State
Low public 
expenditures, low
enrolment rates
in tertiary 
education, weak 
higher-education 
system, weak
vocational 
training, no 
lifelong learning, 
emphasis on 
general
skills
Source: Amable (2003: 104-106)
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The regulation theory approach5, in addition, explains the developments within the 
capitalist systems of the leading Western economies from the end of the Second 
World War until the 1970s, and from the 1970s till today. While the former period is 
termed ”Fordism” in the literature, the latter is usually called ”Post-Fordism” or 
cognitive capitalism (Vercellone, 2007). Fordism was characterised by constant 
economic growth, a result of a rise in wages connected with a rise in productivity, 
relatively low internationalisation of business (which enabled a rise in spending), 
”stable” technologies of massive material production (which enabled better business 
organization) and the Bretton Woods international monetary regime (which lessened 
the business uncertainties by lowering the exchange rate risks). The state fit in with 
its redistributive policies. Fordism was replaced by cognitive capitalism after a 
change in its fundamental relations. This regime is characterised by a high degree 
of uncertainty and a much more ﬂexible organization of production, increasingly 
based on services instead of material production. On top of this, the growing 
financialization6 increases the uncertainty, that is, the volatility of economic 
developments (cf. Stockhammer, 2009; Cvijanović, Fumagalli and Vercellone, 
2010). Croatia was not left out from this change in the institutional relations, as 
further explained below. 
The paper consists of four parts. The introduction summarises the reasons for and 
aims of conducting this type of research, as well as the concepts used in the 
analysis. The second part brieﬂy presents the methodology used, as well as the 
reasons to focus on the manufacturing industry. The third part presents the research 
results as well as their theoretical implications, while the conclusions are presented 
in the fourth and final part. 
2. Methodology
The analysis of changes in the manufacturing sector in the Republic of Croatia, as 
envisaged by this paper, does not present an assessment of its relative performance 
or effect in the usual sense. The emphasis here is rather on changes, trends and 
dynamics of the key indicators in the manufacturing sector. Such a relatively 
rudimentary research goal within a specific institutional surrounding as in Croatia 
generates a number of methodological challenges. Namely, since the system 
analysis and trend dynamics are hardly visible within a year, a representative set of 
data should encompass a statistically significant analytical period. Aiming to 
5 French: théorie de la régulation.
6 The term can on a basic level be understood as the increase in the portion of financial assets in the 
GDP. 
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comprise statistically relevant data, the paper analyses the period between 1970 and 
20057. 
Within this period the manufacturing sector in the Republic of Croatia underwent a 
number of fundamental socio-economic and institutional changes – the end of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as well as the newly gained independence 
of the Republic of Croatia marked a turning point in the operations of businesses in 
the manufacturing sector. In the context of our research, it presents a political 
formalization of the new institutional conditions in the economy – the assumption 
being that the independence of the Republic of Croatia and the severing of legal, 
economic and political ties with the former state were actually a culmination of the 
processes which started earlier. From the economic point of view, this process 
presented a culmination of the process of economic reform started by the so-called 
Marković’s reforms which introduced a number of novelties to the economic 
system and generated expectations, or, as some authors call it, path dependency 
(Meštrović, Cvijanović, 2007, Mencinger, 2006). These expectations partly affected 
the ensuing economic developments. The reforms implemented at the end of the 
eighties institutionally marked a move towards the principles of private ownership 
in a broader sense, and elements of market liberalization and privatization as the 
model of improving efficiency. Thus, in the moment of formally achieving 
independence the businesses were already functioning in the conditions of 
economic and political uncertainty, because the change was inevitable, and it was 
only its scope that was uncertain. 
Methodologically, the data on the manufacturing industry changed vastly and 
required a normalization of the empirical basis in order to ensure comparability 
during the whole analytic period. 
The data collected was then structurally, analytically and synthetically divided into 
two periods. The first period is 1970-1991, while the second one is 1996-2006. 
Namely, the initial assessment of the data showed that for the period 1992-1995, the 
data was not available in an analytically acceptable form8. The initial, nominal data 
was taken from the publications of the Yugoslav Social Accounting Service for the 
period before 1991 and the original data by FINA for the 1996 – 2006 period. A 
separate methodological issue were the changes in the accounting system on the 
one hand and, on the other, the changes in the national classification of economic 
7 We used the data from the research done within a doctoral dissertation by Denis Redžepagić’s, ”The 
Impact of Ownership Structure on the Company Success in the Conditions of Transition – 
Transformation of Ownership and Privatisation in the case of the Republic of Croatia”, University of 
Split Faculty of Economics, ongoing. 
8 This was due to a number of reasons. The period was marked by the Homeland War, economic 
uncertainty and changes in the institutions tasked with collecting statistical data, which all 
jeopardized the reliability and usability of the data from the period. 
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activities. The key methodological problem was to classify and match values of 
individual, historical pieces of data to standardized, substantial attributes of each 
variable in the present. This was especially pertinent for temporal differences in the 
classification of economic activities, which is why the data was collected for a pre-
selected set of activities, specifically: agriculture, hunting and forestry; fishing 
industry; manufacturing industry; construction; trade; hotels and restaurants and 
transport, storage and communications. 
The nominal data collected were then normalized by correcting for the value of the 
Special Drawing Rights (SDR) coefficient. This provided the financial value of the 
variables which were then corrected by constant price indices, thus normalizing the 
time series of nominal values of financial variables into a time series of financial 
variables in constant prices. A separate problem was the change in value of the 
Yugoslav dinar during the period analysed. In order to make the data on businesses 
in the time series comparable to the post-independence period, and normalize 
massive changes caused by periods of inﬂation and hyperinﬂation, all values were 
expressed in the SDR currency equivalent9. The use of SDR values does not aim to 
accurately state the values for each year of the period analysed, but it is assumed to be 
one of the acceptable methods of assessing trends changes. The deﬂator calculation 
was based on the World Bank data. It used the data10 on the inﬂation in the eurozone 
as the main trade partner, and calculated the constant price values in relation to the 
year 1970. The hyperinﬂation periods in 1989, 1990 and 1991 render it a period of 
limited use which is why the data produced for those years were not used. 
9 SDR, Special Drawing Rights, were introduced into the international monetary system by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1969 with the aim to ”support the Bretton Woods system of 
fixed exchange rates” (IMF, 2009, p. 40). Today they are used by the IMF as a unit of account, while 
it is necessary to add that the SDR is not a currency, but a ”potential claim on IMF member countries’ 
foreign exchange assets” – the currency equivalent of the exchange rate changes within the ”currency 
basket” containing euro, Japanese yen, UK pound and US dollar. The relative standing of the 
currencies in the basket is changed every five years, depending on the assessment of each currency 
by the degree to which it is used as a foreign exchange reserve asset by the IMF members and the 
amount of exports sold in that currency. For example, in the 2011-2015 period the relative value of 
the US dollar is 41.9% of the SDR value, euro holds 37.4%, yen 9.4% and the UK pound 11.3% 
(Source: IMF). The IMF publishes data on the historic values of the SDR and Croatian kuna 
exchange rate (the IMF archives are available on the Internet: http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/
data/param_rms_mth.aspx), while the comparative exchange rate of the Yugoslav dinar was taken 
from the archival data of the Bank of Slovenia (Bank of Slovenia: “Obračunski tečaji 1954-1965”, 
Internet: http://www.bsi.si/financni-podatki.asp?MapaId=429. The former SFRY was a member of 
the IMF from 1945, so the values of the exchange rate are available for the whole period.). 
10 The global development indicators database can be found on the Internet: http://data.un.org/. 
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3. Analysis and discussion
Political capitalism of the late socialist period in Croatia, as Županov (2002)11 calls 
it, developed into a system that Amable (2003) ”today” calls the South-European 
capitalism, the characteristics of which are described in table 1 – with some 
additional qualifications we list below. It is possible to say that neither of the two 
systems can be considered strictly market-based, that is, they have not developed 
the institutions nor achieved top economic performance (i.e., for example, GDP per 
capita and competiveness) of the type that is (or was) present in other socio-
economic systems. Although it is not strictly possible to compare these two 
classifications – not solely because Županov’s classification is primarily 
sociological, while Amable’s one is primarily economic – they will serve to describe 
these two systems. 
The emphasis on the production and the manufacturing sector was the backbone of 
the reconstruction program in former Yugoslavia after World War II. The economic 
logic for the reindustrialisation of the country was the logical result of economic 
lagging behind the surroundings (Harrisson, 1994). However, the emphasis was not 
so much on production as on labour, so the constant level of employment became 
the absolute political priority, while competiveness became a secondary goal which 
was largely to be taken care of by the enterprises. The key characteristic of the 
former system was a high level of workers’ rights protection, brought about by the 
large inﬂuence of workers on the decision-making process within the self-
management system. The economic composition was based on sectoral 
concentration in large individual companies with a parallel existence of smaller and 
even private companies. In the course of institutional changes and after the Republic 
of Croatia gained independence, the company structure was changed and large 
companies were restructured by separate privatization of their parts. 
Inﬂexibility, mentioned by the critics of the system (Šonje, 1993) as the key problem 
of self-management, was especially prominent in the labour market, which is why the 
institutional surrounding was not able to implement the reform measures which, 
paradoxically, were ideologically opposed to the economic policy goals, but necessary 
for achieving efficiency. Namely, the liberalisation of the labour market would require 
11 Županov (2002: 64) lists the following features of the political capitalism in the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY): ”Social (state) ownership, 2) Fragmented market (for the greatest 
part, there are only products on the market), 3) Politically orchestrated market (monopoles), 4) The 
lead actors are political, instead of professional managers. In a broader sense, political management 
also includes political officials in firms and local communities, and the management is directly 
connected to the higher levels of the political hierarchy, 5) The state has two fundamental functions: 
a) it is a ”protector” (it protects firms from external competition and ultimately covers for losses); 
b) it is the ”nanny” of the employed staff (it provides employees with ”ownership” over their 
workplace and vast social rights). 6) A large portion of the GDP is redistributed through state 
channels (the budget, extra-budgetary balance, para-governmental funds etc.)”
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labour mobility, which was not compatible with the political principles of the system. 
In spite of this, significant rates of economic growth were achieved (Družić, 2005). 
However, the system was inherently instable – the necessary rise in exports was not 
easy to achieve without political reforms. The escalation of the problems during the 
eighties, ”the lost decade” (Nikić, 1997) only aggravated the already damaged 
economic relations within the system, which ultimately led to far-reaching economic 
reforms and Croatian independence, which is also partly confirmed by Horvat (2001), 
particularly in relation to the political crisis of the system not prepared to deal with 
structural problems (Prasnikar and Pregl, 1991).
The data on the average number of enterprises and employment are shown in the 
picture 1. It is visible that the number of the employed decreased during the period 
analysed, while the number of enterprises increased drastically during the 
restructuring of large enterprises before conversion. In other words, the size of the 
average enterprise in the system on average decreased. In the pre-1990 period there 
was a significant rise in the number of enterprises compared to 1974, which was 
also a consequence of institutional changes, i.e. the privatisation of enterprises 
which included restructuring and ”breaking down” of enterprises into smaller 
pieces. The economy contracted after 1990, and a period of significant employment 
growth during the eighties. Estimates show that in the period of ownership 
transformation only, 329,426 workplaces were lost (DUR, 2004), as shown in the 
picture 1. 
The increase in the number of enterprises was particularly acute after 1990. 
Interestingly, sector employment varied greatly, as shown in picture 2. 
The decline of employment can only partly be explained by the restructuring of 
enterprises, since this variable is affected by a number of factors. On the other hand, 
the analysis of the employment structure shows that decline was the highest in the 
manufacturing industry. The opposite happened in the trade sector, with a significant 
rise in the number of employees between the two periods. An average decline of 
employment is also visible in the hospitality sector, agriculture and construction. 
Two simultaneous effects were present in the period analysed. On the one hand, the 
expected technical redundancy of workers, appearing in concentrated sectors, has 
decreased due to the dispersion of companies. On the other hand, unjustified cuts in 
the number of employees occurred at the same time. For example, in 1996 there were 
888,738 people in Croatia receiving pensions, and 1,200,386 in 2010 (Croatian 
Pension Insurance Institute, 2011:10). According to the 1985 data, there were 543,654 
people receiving pensions in Croatia that year (Bureau of Statistics, 1986: 296). In 
terms of the employment structure in selected sectors, two significant changes can be 
identified. Firstly, during the eighties a crisis occurred in the manufacturing and other 
sectors. However, it is clear that the manufacturing industry and trade were most 
affected by privatisation, and this is where the biggest changes occurred. 
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In other sectors there was a visible correction of employment which can be assumed 
to be caused by technical redundancies. The decrease is balanced and can thus be 
interpreted as a correction. Secondly, the manufacturing sector saw a fall in all 
economic indicators as well as employment, thus generating a decrease in the 
activity of the whole sector. This is an argument in favour of the claim that the 
manufacturing sector should have first been restructured and then privatised, which 
would lessen the negative impact on the whole economy as well as the employment 
structure. Additionally, this demonstrates that the restructuring costs were taken 
over by the state, primarily by accommodating the unemployed workers. 
Picture 1: Number of enterprises and employed in Croatian economy in chosen 
industries in the period from 1970-2006
Source: Research done by Denis Redžepagić for his doctoral dissertation
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Picture 2: Structure of the number of employed in several chosen industries
Source: Research done by Denis Redžepagić for his doctoral dissertation
Table 2 shows the average growth rates in the manufacturing industry. 
Table 2: Growth rates in the manufacturing industry
Income and expenditure 
/ growth rates
Growth rates  
1970-1980
Growth rates  
1981-1989
Growth rates  
1996-2006
Growth rates  
1970-2006
1. Total income 0.033 0.787 0.093 -0.022 
2. Total expenditure 0.033 0.785 0.085 -0.013 
Source: Research done by Denis Redžepagić for his doctoral dissertation
It can be concluded from the data presented in the table 2 that the growth rates were 
relatively moderate during the whole period. Although the post-2000 period has 
been perceived as a period of economic growth, this was not sufficient to achieve a 
significant growth during the whole period. Of course, it has to be added that 
growth rates do not indicate the quality, i.e. the degree in which growth is connected 
to a growth in productivity and investment in new technologies – it can thus be 
concluded that the sluggish growth during the nineties was partly a consequence of 
inefficient investment in the manufacturing industry during the preceding period. 
Although these indicators are relatively basic, they indicate that the manufacturing 
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sector development has been almost negligible during a longer period – for the past 
twenty years. In spite of the fact that the post-independence loss of traditional 
markets strongly affected the total income of the Croatian manufacturing industry, 
the long-term decrease of income is an indicator of competitiveness rather than an 
indicator of losing markets. It is rational to assume that a set of enterprises is 
capable to adapt their offer to new markets in a mid-term period. Their failure to do 
so indicates a structural problem of a lack of competitiveness and a rational 
industrial policy. 
When compared to the total revenue of all activities selected, two activities stand 
out at the beginning of the period analysed – trade and manufacturing industry, as 
presented in the table 3. When looking at the shares, the two industries combined 
made up for 74% of the total aggregated revenue of all the activities in 1970. At the 
end of the period analysed, in 2006, their share dropped to 62%. However, the 
portion of trade dropped by 0.3%, while the fall was much more pronounced in the 
manufacturing industry share in the total income, which fell to 26%. 
Table 3. Structure of the total revenue of the selected activities in Croatia 
– in % 
Sectors / year 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1996 2000 2006
1. Agriculture, hunting 
and forestry
9.12 4.90 5.09 5.73 0.00 4.26 3.38 2.25
2. Fishing 0.14 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.20 0.13 0.17 0.14
3. Manufacturing 
industry
37.12 41.18 39.79 44.18 42.86 33.31 32.09 26.25
4. Construction 7.39 6.86 9.28 7.09 6.39 7.42 5.98 9.13
5. Trade 36.67 37.16 36.89 34.33 30.46 33.98 35.84 36.34
6. Hospitality 2.85 2.90 2.95 2.93 4.96 2.29 2.14 1.95
7. Transport, storage and 
communications 
6.71 6.93 5.91 5.65 7.41 8.25 8.70 8.19
8. TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Research done by Denis Redžepagić for his doctoral dissertation
Finally, it is somewhat justified to consider the trend identified during the past 40 
years as cyclical. Namely, the rudimentary indicator of the average enterprise size 
per total income indicates a trend of repeated enterprise amalgamation and market 
concentration. The trend has been identified in distinct sectors and confirms the 
results (Tipurić, Pejić-Bach, 2009) of previous research which identified the 
”pronounced concentration in a small number of industries as a consequence of 
globalisation which enabled multinational companies to enter the Croatian market” 
(Ibid., p. 23). This is particularly true for the sectors of trade, tobacco industry, sale 
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of computers and connected services. In other words, there was a tendency towards 
exploiting high profits but the end-users were individualised. Of course, this was far 
outweighed by the benefits in competitiveness of national enterprises and 
technology transfers, due to the economic structure of the enterprises at the 
beginning of the analytic period, which was primarily oriented towards the domestic 
market. In spite of this, the example of concentration in the trade sector 
demonstrates that concentration is an especially delicate area. For example, research 
done by the Croatian Competition Agency (2011, p. 12) indicates that in the 
Croatian retail sector the aggregate share of five biggest entrepreneurs rose from 
52.4% in 2008 to 58.4% in 2010. 
Following the Amable’s classification (2003), we can describe the Croatian variety of 
capitalism as follows. The product market competition is primarily guided by 
international agreements adopted by the Republic of Croatia. Namely, the Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement signed in 2001 between the European Union and the 
Republic of Croatia (in force since 2005) requires the movement of goods between the 
two parties to be gradually liberalized. Croatian enterprises are generally not very 
innovative, while innovation strategies have been neglected (Račić, Cvijanović and 
Aralica, 2008). This also suggests that non-price elements of competition will be 
marginalised. Market relations are not competitive. Namely, the Croatian labour 
market is segmented, with more generous rights of employees in the public sector and 
some large enterprises (Račić, Babić and Podrug, 2005). Active labour market 
measures turned out to be inadequate (Babić, 2003). The financial sector fits this 
picture since it fails to promote the economic dynamics. The protection of minor 
stakeholders’ interests is extremely low, as indicated by the latest Global 
Competitiveness Report which ranked Croatia 126th out of 142 countries according to 
this criterion. The level of financial market development is also very low, with Croatia 
ranked 87th on a list with 142 places (Schwab, 2011). The financial system is bank-
oriented (with high banking concentration of top 4 banks, which amounted to 66% in 
the first quarter of 2011, calculated on the basis of their assets (Croatian National 
Bank, 2011), which causes it to be loan-oriented, with a minor venture capital market. 
State involvement in the next two institutional areas is not developmentally 
beneficial. As for the social protection, it can be said that Croatia spends a relatively 
large amount of money on the system. However, it is unequally distributed among 
different social groups, which is a consequence of the specific experience of 
transition caused by the 1991-1995 war and clientelist connections which were 
regularly used to distribute privileges. State involvement in such a system is 
significant (Stubbs and Zrinščak, 2011). Total public expenditure on education in 
Croatia, as a percentage of GDP, is significantly lower than the EU-27 average 
(total Croatian expenditure on education amounted to 4.33% in 2008, with EU-27 
average at 5.07% (Eurostat, 2011). However, the percentage of people with higher 
education qualifications is low (32.3 in EU and only 20.5 in Croatia according to 
InnoMetrics, 2011: 62).
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To this, one should add low levels of social capital (Štulhofer, 2003), low levels of 
cooperation among different enterprises (Račić, 2005), and the under-developed 
institutions tasked with supporting market activity (Croatian competition policy 
received grade 3 from EBRD in 2011 on a scale from 1 to 4+. World Bank (2011) 
ranked Croatia 84th out of 183 countries by the overall score in the 2011 Doing 
Business). Also, as mentioned above, there is a high degree of industrial 
concentration in some sectors. 
In Croatia, transition coincided with deindustrialisation and financialization. 
However, while in the developed Western countries deindustrialisation represented 
a process of moving production to other countries with cheaper workforce and 
transition from material production to services, only the latter was the case in 
Croatia. While the global division of labour is in the current framework determined 
according to the knowledge criteria instead of physical resources (cf. Mouhoud, 
2007), in Croatia, however, the orientation is towards lower or intermediate levels 
of technology (see Aralica, 2007 according to Račić, Cvijanović and Aralica, 2008: 
106), at which knowledge does not present a deciding factor. The manufacturing 
industry failed to transfer a significant portion of its activities to other countries, as 
indicated by a low level of direct investments abroad12.
The change in the relation between the financial and the real sector of the economy, 
the educational sector and the system of industrial relations exposes the 
vulnerability of the current institutional surrounding, in which the manufacturing 
industry is incorporated. But, while political capitalism had some institutional 
advantages (such as the stable system of industrial relations and a long-term funding 
of enterprises through the banking system), these were lost in the new variety of 
Croatian capitalism, in spite of the similarities. The reasons were, on the one hand, 
the problems connected to the double ”transition” (from Fordism to cognitive 
capitalism or the ﬂexible accumulation regime and from socialist socio-economic 
order to a mixed economy), which increased the complexity of the whole process. 
On the other hand, the reasons can be found in the institutional and socio-economic 
specificities of Croatia. Namely, as discussed above, it did not develop an 
institutional surrounding which would be beneficial to the manufacturing industry 
dynamics. Despite institutional transformation of the economic system brought by 
the privatisation process which sought to allocate ownership into the private sector 
has not produced undisputable positive effects expected. From the firm viewpoint, 
ownership was not the crucial performance factor. Rather, it was the institutional 
changes, and factors from the economic environment such as the corporate decision 
making structure and income distribution (especially the workforce) which had a 
more profound impact on overall performance.
12 Direct investment abroad for all activities amounted to somewhat less than 4 billion euro between 
1993 and 2010 (Croatian National Bank, 2011a).
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Bićanić (no date) talks about crony capitalism in Croatia as a constant from the 
1990s to the 2000s. Stubbs and Zrinščak (2011) describe clientelist relationships13 
as the basis of a complete social policy. Directors of socialist enterprises, whom 
Županov (2002: 62) denounces as the autocratic proto-capitalist connected with the 
Communist Party and ”regional and local oligarchies” have now been, as suggested 
by Stubbs and Zrinščak (2011: 11), partly replaced by ”tycoons” who made their 
fortunes from privatization. Ivanković and Šonje (2011) deal with un-democratic 
capitalism in Croatia and a few political parties deemed to be highly clientelist. All 
of this suggests that the Croatian variety of capitalism cannot be considered to 
present a ”pure” formal model which perfectly functions in practice, but a model 
ridden by clientelist connections which have the capability to direct the economic 
relations towards socially suboptimal outcomes. The evolution of the economic 
development model has to account for path dependencies and the institutional 
environment in order to resolve the inefficiencies inherent to the current system. 
Arguably, the emphasis on ownership is threatening to drive the debate away from 
the other factors, which could conceivably have a more profound impact, namely 
the institutional setting and related complex network of relationships. 
4. Conclusions
A perception remains that the Croatian independence marked the beginning of 
”modern capitalism”. This paper, however, aims to confirm the hypothesis that the 
Croatian form of capitalism is specific, both in form and development, and linked to 
the previous period, implying a gradual evolution of capitalism. This follows from, 
qualitative and quantitative analysis, with a particular focus on the manufacturing 
industry as a useful framework for the evaluation of the institutional, economic and 
political changes over the past 40 years. The research shows that the key difference 
over that period is almost exclusively institutional in nature, as the changes were 
ideologically geared towards increasing living standards from entirely different 
viewpoints. What is more, the institutional deficiencies caused a competitiveness 
decrease of the manufacturing industry and consequently a fall in employment. The 
only constant characteristic in the evolution of Croatian ”capitalism” is that it is not 
relying on markets to any significant extent. However, the ”institutional fit” of the 
system nowadays is far less adjusted internally and externally than it used to be in 
the late phases of the socialist market economy (or political capitalism). 
The state carried the burden of main activities and public costs during the transition, 
due to a significant increase in unemployment. Despite employment decreases in all 
analysed activities, the reduction in the manufacturing sector is particularly stark. 
13 The Croatian Language Portal (2011) defines clientelism as ”a form of political corruption by non-
monetary bribes”. 
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This is partially an ex post argument for the claim that restructuring of the 
manufacturing sector was required before the privatisation, as this would reduce the 
negative impact on the economy and the labour market. However, the institutional 
changes led to a drastic reduction of the role of the manufacturing sector in the 
economy. The analysis of the manufacturing sector in comparison with the 
institutional environment enabled the identification of the continuity between the 
two systems as the performance data is comparable between the two periods, which 
is not the case for other sectors, namely the financial sector. This allows for 
comparison of physical outputs and related performance data. Furthermore, key 
factors for the industrial decline were identified namely the institutional changes, 
and implicitly the industrial policy as well as the environment, covering a broad and 
complex spectrum of inherited and evolving social and economic relationships. 
The research contributes to the relatively scant literature on the Croatian types of 
capitalism, and enrich the insights into the economic and institutional aspects of 
transition. What is more, it is a good basis for further research to explain a feasible 
and desirable transformation of the manufacturing sector. The limitations of this 
research are mainly quantitative, as not all data are available, particularly for the 
period from 1992-1995. Further research should determine the Croatian type of 
capitalism in more detail, considering its trajectory and development potential in 
the relative near future. The results of the research in this paper could assist further 
research based on more developed economical and political guidelines.
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Od političkog kapitalizma do klijentelističkog kapitalizma?  
Slučaj Hrvatske1
Vladimir Cvijanović2, Denis Redžepagić3
Sažetak
Cilj je istraživanja analiza tipologije kapitalizma u Republici Hrvatskoj. Hrvatski 
je oblik kapitalizma specifičan, u formi i nastajanju, te postoje poveznice između 
perioda bivše države i Republike Hrvatske zbog kojih možemo govoriti o 
postupnom procesu evolucije kapitalizma, iz političkog tijekom osamdesetih 
godina prema kapitalizmu s klijentelističkim karakteristikama – kakvog uočavamo 
danas. Izdvojena je prerađivačka industrija kao ogledan primjer kroz kojeg se 
mogu bolje sagledati institucionalne, političke i ekonomske promjene tijekom 
posljednjih 40-ak godina. Pritom je naglasak na implikacijama institucionalnih 
promjena koje su, osim dakako učinka Domovinskog rata, u velikoj mjeri utjecale 
na proces evolucije kapitalizma u Republici Hrvatskoj. Glavni rezultat istraživanja 
je kako je tranzicija generirala niz troškova, najveći dio kojih je snosila upravo 
država, kroz povećanje broja nezaposlenih te smanjenja industrijske proizvodnje i 
razine socijalnog kapitala. Tvrdnja da prerađivačka industrija nosi breme 
nekonkurentnosti iz prošlih razdoblja zapravo zanemaruje nužnu raspravu o ulozi 
države u formiranju industrijske politike i djelovanju na tržištu. Također, to je post 
festum argument za tvrdnju da je restrukturiranje prerađivačkog sektora trebalo 
provesti prije privatizacije, jer bi se tako smanjio njezin negativni učinak. Međutim 
institucionalne su promjene dovele do drastičnog smanjenja uloge prerađivačke 
industrije u ekonomiji. Temeljni je zaključak rada kako je promjena međuodnosa 
financijskog i realnog sektora ekonomije, obrazovnog sustava te sustava 
industrijskih odnosa razotkrila ranjivost sadašnjeg institucionalnog okružja, u koji 
je uklopljena prerađivačka industrija. Određene institucionalne prednosti 
političkog kapitalizma gube se u novom tipu hrvatskog kapitalizma, unatoč svim 
sličnostima. Razlozi leže u složenosti procesa dvostruke »tranzicije« i 
institucionalnim odnosno socio-ekonomskim specifičnostima.
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